Abstract --This paper examines the results obtained by simulating an aircraft navigation system with a partial complement of a typical avionics Sensor array using two different techniques of estimation processes: the conventional Kalman and the federated filter architectures. Areas of interest include error state estimation accuracy, residual behavior under induced Sensor failure conditions, and potential for failure detection and isolation. Several simulations were accomplished for each filter design and the results were compared in order to verify the validity of the recently developed federated filter architecture. Comparison of the error state estimation accuracies of the two filter designs revealed excellent overall performances for both. The identification of failures showed a definite advantage in the federated filter design. Having Sensordedicated local filters allowed for easy sensor failure identification for the federated filter, while the centralized filter design suffered from navigation solution conuption. Once established as a valuable estimation technique, the federated filter will add significantly to the viable alternatives when choosing a filter architecture for avionics modifications or implementations.
INTRODUCTION
system [l] . A master filter combines the estimates from the bank of filters to obtain a typically suboptimal navigation solution. This poses less of a computational burden per filter than a centralized filter implementation. Although these estimates are typically slightly suboptimal, the distributed filter offers improvements over the cenrralized fault detection and isolation schemes. [1, 2, 3, 41 The advantage of the federated filter architecture is obtained through the sharing of the estimation information by the sensor-dedicated local filters. The recombination of this shared information in the master filter significantly improves the quality of the error state estimates over previous distributed filter designs [1, 2, 4] . Figure 1 depicts the common structure of a federated filter architecture application to a multi-sensor navigation system. The objective of this paper is to provide the results from a comparison of the overall estimation performances between the federated filter design and the wellestablished Centralized Kalman Filter (CKF) design, along with a comparison of their general respective Failure Detection and Isolation 0 1 ) capabilities.
The cenaalized Kalman filter is the most common filter design implemented in the integmted navigation systems of United States Air Force aircraft today. The CKF receives all available measurements and combines all the information contained in those measurements to obtain an optimal navigation solution. For simple, well-modeled linear systems, the CKF is unquestionably the optimal estimator [l] . When considering tradeoffs of data flow, algorithmic requirements, and processing speed versus optimality, fault tolerance, estimation in a multi-sensor environment is often best treated as a distributed estimation problem [l] . The Distributed Kalman Filter @KF) architectures employ a bank of local Kalman filters dedicated to the sensors which provide measurement information to the From the block diagram in Figure 1 , the master filter provides the possible reset information to the sensor-dedicated local fdters and the correction information to the Inertial Navigation System (INS). The Failure Detection, Isolation, and Reconfiguration (FDIR) capabilities of the federami filter represent the area where the largest disparity is expected to occur in the performances of the two designs, with substantial advantage being given to the federated filter design. The fault detection aspects of this effort are centered around monitoring the residual outputs provided by each of the independent local filters and that of the centralized filter. The residual sequence is theoretically a white Gaussian sequence of zero-mean with covariance being a function of the observation mahix H(ti), the error state covariance P($-), and the measurement process noise R(ti):
During operation of the filter, the actual residual sequence can be monitored and compared to this description. If the description appears to be violated consistently, then one can deduce that something has occurred to invalidate the model within the filter. Otherwise, if the violation occurs in only one component of a vector residual process, then it can be assumed that the measuring device generating that particular residual component is the source of the difficulty.
[9] Thus, monitoring the residuals of the centralized filter and those at the local filter level in the federated design has the potential to provide accurate fault detection information. The federated filter also provides the capability to monitor local filter fusion residuals [4] . Table 1 lists the residuals used according to the measurements available from the specific sensors.
The filter comparison required a two-stage effort. First, a cenrralized filter analysis was performed. This included a ten-run Monte Carlo ensemble average of all available error state outputs to facilitate the initial phase of the comparison. Next, the one-run baseline residual output plots which represent ordinary magnitude residuals under normal operating conditions for the next phase of the comparison were obtained. Finally, a small magnitude constant bias failure in the measurements was introduced.
The second stage involved a federated filter analysis with the exact same truth and filter model states as was used for By recombination we mean a weighted least squares average involving the local estimates and covariances but not involving any cross-covariances. The precise definition of the principle is the "total system information can remain constant or decrease, but never increase, due to sharing".
Without adhering to this information sharing principle, the distributed filter design is subject to p r accuracy and even divergence The local filters receive sensor measurements and reference system information from the INS. The master filter provides the INS corrections, while combining the information provided by the filters into a globally optimal or suboptimal navigation solution.
For the no-reset mode, the master filter retains none of the fused information, while the local filters collectively retain all of the local information. This no-reset design is highly fault tolerant and, therefore, provides excellent performance for FDI because the local filters operate independently of each other. [2,4] During the propagation cycles, each of the local filters multiplies its common process noise variances by the information sharing fractions in order to share the whole process noise information among them. During measurement update cycles, the local filters perform normal processing of the data from their independent sensors.
FOUNDATIONS FOR COMPARISON
The truth models are composed of original error states and those states denoted as wide-band noises which are to 
The Filter Model State Description
The filter models provided for the CKF and DKF designs are reduced-order implementations of the truth models for each system as appropriate. 
RESULTS AND OBSERVATIONS
A typical tactical fighter flight profile was used for the analysis and includes ingress to a low level temin following and terrain avoidance segment, a SAR target acquisition pop-up maneuver, a target bombing run, and egress from the low level portion [l]. The desired simulation data required a series of ten-run and single-run Monte Carlo analyses, accomplished with a flight duration from 0 to 7200 seconds.
The Centralized Versus Federated Filter
A general comparison can be made with respect to filter performance by comparing the like filter error state performance plots for each filter implementation. For both the centralized and federated filters, the first 16 states correspond to estimates of the errors in the INS and can be compared directly in relative magnitudes of error and their associated one-sigma bounds. The last 13 states likewise correspond to the GPS, SAR, and TAN filter error state performances. The centralized filter provides these state performance outputs based on single filter operations. The federated filter design has the INS error state performances output f " the master filter, the GPS error state performances output from local filter #1, the S A R error state performances output from local filter #2, and the TAN error state performance output from local filter #3. The GPS provides a set of eight measurements every five seconds. The four satellite operation requires a pseudorange and a pseudorange-rate residual for each satellite.
The SARPVU and SAREO systems provide seven measurements every 100 seconds. The TAN sensor provides one measurement every ten seconds.
The next step for obtaining fault detection evaluations, was to implement the failures by directly corrupting the measurements prior to the calculation of the residuals.
Soft failures were not induced in all the measurements for all the sensors. It was decided that a constant bias on the second GPS measurement, the pseudorange-rate measurement for satellite #1, and on the TAN measurement would represent a soft constant bias failure quite well for this study. No corresponding constant bias failure was applied to the satellite #1 pseudorange measurement. The effective rime of GPS bias is from 10oO seconds to 3500 seconds and was done by adding a constant value of 0.50 ft/sec to the incoming pseudorange-rate measurement. This was deemed a sufficient duration and magnitude for failure and detection. The effective time of the TAN bias is from 4500 seconds to 6500 seconds and was done by adding a constant value of 150 ft to the incoming ground clearance measurement. This provided sufficient time for filter recovery before inducing the TAN failure and allowed for the proper detection magnitude. The TAN and GPS soft failure levels were chosen so that they would not be rejected by a 3 or 5 sigma residual screening test in the filter.
The residual behavior of the pseudorange of satellite #1 for the federated and centralized filters reflected the greatest impact. Both sets of residuals were alike and Figure 5 . Consequently, the pseudorange calculations are impacted by a 0.5 f t / s error and the filter is continuously mistaken when calculating the pseudorange.
Another transient is experienced when the constant bias is removed, and the filter again settles into normal operations accepting these values as accurate. The filters do not reject the biased residuals, but instead use them to update their respective navigation solutions because the fault is less than the residual test failure threshold. The one-sigma bounds for the offset portion in the pseudorange residuals of satellite #1 for both filters do not increase appropriately because the filters are unaware of the failure and continue on without compensation. Lastly, even though the TAN measurement failed from 4500 to 6500 seconds, the dominance of the GPS accuracy did not allow this failure to impact the GPS residuals even in the centralized filter design. Although they are not presented here, the other GPS pseudorange-rate residuals are affected and show transient behavior because the filter expectation of the residuals is calculated after the most recent update cycle from the one-by-one scalar measurement processing algorithm used in the software.
The real benefit of this comparison is seen when com- at an adverse influence from the error induced in the TAN system. There is no actual failure in the S A R system, yet a S A R fault is falsely indicated by the centralized filter and can force the sensor to be taken out of the navigation solution.
The federated filter TAN ground clearance residual plot in Figure 8 shows the residual spikes at 4500 and 6500 seconds and indicates the TAN bias failure.
The centralized filter TAN ground clearance residual in Figure 9 shows the effects of the GPS failure initially and it also shows the relative effects of the SAR residual impact due to the GPS failure.
Because the GPS sensor is the most dominant in accuracy, it would be difficult to detect an impact in the centralized filter's GPS residuals due to any other, lessaccurate Sensor failure. However, the no-reset mode of the federated filter, by design, does not allow conuption of the other local filter navigation solutions when a particular sensor is failed, regardless of the sensor's accuracy. analysis.
Fault Detection and Isolation
The performances of the two filter designs under failedsensor conditions revealed their respective fault tolerance capabilities. The obvious choice for fault tolerance would have to be the federated filter design using the no-reset mode because the sensor-dedicated filters' measurements and navigation solutions are kept independent.
The centralized filter suffers from the lack of accurate sensor fault identifkation when a failure occurs. Note that the exception is the hard failure which occurs and is detected immediately, and subsequently the filter rejects that bad information. If the detection is not immediate and the failure information is incorporated into the navigation solution, missed detections and false alarms appear inevitable. Thus, a perfectly good sensor may be removed from the navigation solution. The GPS is so dominant that the filter would have more confidence in its measurement information than that of the S A R or TAN under these chcumstances. This is the reason for the GPS residuals not reflecting any impact from the TAN failures. The federated filter allows for a more efficient voting scheme because the residuals from the local filters are not affected by the other sensor's bad information. This is limited to the level of accuracy of each of the respective sensors. It would take a great deal of error on the part of the GPS before the TAN and S A R could vote that filter out of the master filter navigation solution.
Additionally, failure modelling would allow more complicated failure modes in the sensor operations. Perhaps, for the GPS system, allowing for availability of less than four satellites would prove fruitful for further study.
Further, INS failure modes could easily be implemented in source code. Gradual failures of the INS appear to be a topic of great concern. The failure simulations in the S A R and TAN systems can be relatively de-emphasized in both filter implementations because the GPS obviously dominates the estimation processes due to its greater accuracy. The S A R and TAN systems proved most useful when considering the impact of GPS failures on other systems and the aspects of filtering.
Perhaps, one of the most important aspects of fault detection is the application of the detection algorithm. If the algorithm was included in the simulation such that it could provide detection information to the output data files, then failure analysis, and then possibly system reconfiguration could be performed on line while the simulation is being performed. This might also include some Multiple Model Adaptive Estimation (MMAE) considerations [ 111. Thus, enhancing the possibilities for system reconfiguration testing under failed subsystem conditions.
summary
The potential for follow-on study is great in this area
The federated filter is an excellent implementation of filtering theory. Comparisons of the federated design to the centralized design will likely be carried on into the twenty-first century. Hopefully, any advancements in filtering theory which enable engineers to simplify the task of obtaining a navigation solution under normal or failed operating conditions will be utilized to their full advantage. This study definitely shows that the federated filter is worthy of serious consideration for integrated navigation.
